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Abstract 
In this paper, we empirically examine the theoretical concept of “impossible trinity” (financial 
trilemma) for Sweden for the period of 2010-2017. While doing this, we modified the 
Aizenman, Chinn and Ito approach by adding an extra interaction term to the main 
regression which shows whether these three policies are implemented in harmony without 
creating any trade-offs. Similarly, this interaction term also reflects the effectiveness of all 
supportive policies (i.e. hoarding international reserves, liquidity policies etc.) in order to 
eliminate the trade-offs between the monetary independence, exchange rate stability and 
capital openness. Our results indicate that the standard ACI approach is not sufficient in 
explaining Sweden’s economic policies and adding an interaction term to the main trilemma 
regression is both necessary and critical. From the latter perspective, the interaction term 
has a negative contribution indicating that Sweden could achieve to relax the binding 
trilemma trade-offs in this period. Lastly, our analysis continues by exploring the implications 
of the interaction term for inflation in a VAR and Granger Causality analyses where we find 
that interaction term has certain decreasing impact on inflation.  
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SWEDISH TRILEMMA TRADE-OFFS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A critical challenge for an open economy is mainly on managing exchange rates, interest 
rates and capital account openness concurrently given the certain trade-offs among policies. 
These trade-offs may exist between interest rate policy independence, exchange rate 
stability, and financial integration as manifested by Mundell and Fleming (1963). Accordingly, 
changing one component is necessarily associated with a corresponding change in other two 
components. Accordingly, an economy cannot position itself on all three vertexes of the 
triangle of Figure 1 at once. On the other hand, since each of the three goals is desirable for 
economies, it is conceivable that policy makers still try to meet all three at least partially. This 
can be illustrated as being at a point in the interior area of the triangle. For example, a 
country might have a managed float and some monetary independence, sacrificing some 
capital openness. 
 
There have been works in the literature on achieving all three goals to some extent: Obstfeld 
(1998) introduces the term as “open-economy trilemma” and Calvo and Reinhart (2001 and 
2002) discusses that there could be limited monetary autonomy even under the free float 
regime. Rodrik (2000) presented a general overview of the trilemma in an international 
environment. Bordo and Flandreau (2003) show that monetary autonomy is considerable 
even under the classical gold standard. Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004) reinterpret 
the constraints of the trilemma as they are mostly driven by historical applications rather than 
the necessary theoretical implications of the Mundell-Fleming model.  
 
While there have been such studies in the literature, the underlying theoretical framework of 
the trilemma, is not easily adapted to analyzing the partial attainment of all three goals in 
formal theoretical modelling.  More recently Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (ACI, 2008 and 2011), 
develop a new methodology to empirically characterize trade-offs in practical policymaking. 
In their approach, ACI initially measure each policy dimension via an empirical index which 
takes values between zero and one. The theoretical constraint of trade-offs between the 
three policy-goals is then captured by the coefficients in a regression where a constant is 
regressed on the trilemma indices.  Multiplying these coefficients with their means result in 
contribution figures which determines the exact position of the country in the triangle. In their 
 study, ACI has performed a panel data analysis employing the data of 170 countries whereas 
Hutchison, Sengupta, and Nirvikar Singh (2012) and Cortuk and Singh (2013) adapt ACI’s 
methodology to emerging market economies in a time series analysis. This paper also 
adapts a similar approach to these time series analyses but focuses on a developed country, 
Sweden, and also proposes to add a new term into the main trilemma regression.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a brief description of Sweden 
macroeconomic policies. Section 3 describes the methodology and the dataset used. Lastly, 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. SWEDISH ECONOMY 
Swedish economy is classified as a small open economy as the term is used in textbooks.  
Sweden liberalised its policies with respect to cross-border movement of capital and there 
are no obstacles to cross-border transactions for over two decades in this respect.  
With regard to monetary policy, the objective is to maintain price stability and hence to attain 
the inflation target. Weak inflationary pressures and low global interest rates are determinant 
issues that define Sweden’s monetary policy in the post global crisis period (Riksbank, 
2017). In this respect, the Central bank of Sweden, the Riksbank, has gradually cut its policy 
rate to below zero percent level together with special contingency plans to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market. The monetary policy has affected the financial conditions in an 
expansionary way with regard to interest rates and the exchange rate (Riksbank, 2017). In 
this context, the Swedish krona is considered to be considerably stronger today if the 
Riksbank had not conducted such an expansionary monetary policy (Riksbank, 2017). Within 
this context, during the period of 2010-2017, Sweden implemented an active monetary policy 
whose one of the aims is to attain a more stable exchange rate in a financially open 
environment. 
 
3. DATA and METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data 
Our approach of constructing the trilemma indices mainly follows ACI approach with some 
departures. We initially construct indices for each of the three policy objectives of the 
trilemma: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and capital openness. But instead 
of using a cross-country sample with time-averages of annual data as in ACI, we use data for 
 a single country, Sweden for the period of 2010:1-2017:6. We also use a different measure 
of capital account openness which is dictated by the needs of a time series analysis of 
trilemma policy stances.  
 
The data we employ, being monthly, is higher in frequency than employed by ACI, and 
subject to substantial time variation. For composing the trilemma indices, we obtain monthly 
data on exchange rate and capital flows from the Riksbank website. Effective overnight rates 
are collected from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website. Industrial Production and 
inflation data are collected from Statistics Sweden website (www.scb.se). 
Trilemma indices are constructed as follows: 
 
3.2. Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) Index  
 
Using the monthly standard deviations of the daily change in the log of the Swedish Krona-
US dollar exchange rate, the index is constructed according to the formula below: 
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The scaling ensures that the index takes values between 0 and 1 whereas the highest value 
indicates to the greatest degree of exchange rate stability. The Figure 2 illustrates the MI 
index. 
 
3.3. Monetary Independence (MI) Index  
 
We again follow ACI (2008) in measuring MI as the reciprocal of the correlation of interest 
rates between Sweden and the base country (US). Monthly correlations of overnight rates 
are used as opposed to the yearly correlations of monthly rates used in ACI (2008). The 
index is constructed as: 
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This index also lies between 0 and 1, with the highest value implying to the greatest degree 
of monetary independence as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 3.4. Capital Openness (KO) Index  
 
Constructing a Capital Openness Index is the most critical and problematic issue for our 
purposes. In the literature, there are both de jure and de facto measures.  ACI use the de 
jure measure capital account openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008). 
According to them, capital openness is based on information regarding restrictions in the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Specifically, capital openness is the first standardized principal component of the variables 
that indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on i) current account 
transactions, ii)capital account transactions, iii) the requirement of the surrender of export 
proceeds. According to this Index, capital openness is essentially constant over the entire 
period for Sweden, and may not capture well the changes that have been occurring in 
management of the capital account. Other de jure measures also suffer from the same 
problem as they are only annual, and do not change for Sweden over time during the period 
of 2010-2017M6. 
 
Oppositely, de facto measures which are classified mainly based on price differentials and 
quantities of capital flows vary over time. Thus, price based measures deal with interest 
parity conditions while quantity based measures take into consideration of capital flow 
volumes. The uncovered or real interest rate parity (Cheung, et al., 2003) and international 
arbitrage pricing model (IAPM) or capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) (see De Gregorio, 
1998) are examples of the de facto measures based on price differentials.  De facto 
measures based on quantities make use of capital flows such as volumes of capital flows, or 
the ratio of these flows to GDP as discussed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). This type of 
measure can provide sufficient frequency for our purposes. 
 
In our case, the lack of data with sufficient frequency on de jure controls dictates us 
employing a de facto measure.  On the other hand, de facto measures are more susceptible 
to other macroeconomic effects than solely on policy decisions. Hence, they reflect changes 
in macroeconomic conditions even if there is no regulatory change on capital account 
transactions. Given the varying nature of de facto measures, we employ a quantity based de 
facto measure in our analysis.  
 
Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), we employed portfolio investments monthly data of 
non-resident holdings of Swedish interest-bearing securities. Given the GDP figures are 
 quarterly, we simply adjusted portfolio investments with the industrial production index. The 
Figure 4 illustrates this and this index fluctuates between 0 and 1.  
Yet, for robustness, we also develop a new index that takes values of only 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 
and 1 depending on intensity of the capital flows. This new index can be classified between a 
de facto measure and de jure measure in terms of its varying behaviour given the fact that it 
is not constant like a de jure measure but it does not vary each month like a de facto 
measure as well.  
 
3.5. Methodology 
 
Following ACI (2008), we initially test the validity of the trilemma assuming a linear relation 
among the policy choices. This reduces to examining the goodness of fit of this linear 
regression. 
 
                      (1) 
 
The contributions obtained from equation (1) for the subsamples are reported in Table 1. 
This table reports the means, coefficients and contributions of the three indices. The overall 
fit is extremely good, reflected in the high adjusted R-squared figure. The total contribution is 
1.99 being close to 2. This indicates that trilemma trade-offs are binding for Sweden. Results 
show that contribution of exchange rate stability is the sole dominant factor in the trilemma of 
Sweden and other policies have almost no role in this set up. Besides, capital openness, 
albeit insignificant, has negative contribution in the trilemma. 
 
In reality, these contributions do not quite reflect the economic policies of Sweden. Especially 
capital openness having negative contribution is not realistic. This is mainly because even 
though capital openness may not have a direct contribution, yet it definitely has indirect effect 
on the policies. Thus, we propose a modified version of ACI approach to capture this.  
                          
 
In this new set-up; we propose to add an interaction term which is the multiplicative term of 
three policies of MI, ERS and KO. The interaction term acts as the common contribution in 
the trilemma regression. This term reflects how successfully all three policies are being 
 implemented in harmony in a way to minimize the trade-offs. Accordingly, we expect this 
term to have a negative coefficient and contribution so that the total contribution of other 
three policies is higher than 2. This is because this interaction term gives more space to 
three main policies and mitigates the trade-offs between the policies of monetary 
independence, capital openness and exchange rate stability. This is in line with the ACI’s 
explanation of reserves indicating that a massive amount of foreign reserves might allow the 
relaxation of the trilemma, i.e., achieve all three goals at the same time. In other words, if the 
country has accumulated sufficient amount of international reserves, then it can make use of 
its policies (MI, ERS and KO) in a way to support each other and hence eliminate the trade-
offs among each other. The interaction term represents not only international reserves but 
also all other supportive policies i.e. liquidity policies, requires reserve policies etc. that can 
be employed in order to eliminate the trade-offs. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of this new modified trilemma regression. Results indicate that 
exchange rate stability has again the highest contribution. However, contributions of 
monetary independence and capital openness become statistically significant. As expected, 
the interaction term has a negative contribution enabling the total contribution of monetary 
independence, exchange rate stability and capital openness close 3.  
 
3.6. Impact of Interaction Term On Inflation 
In this section, we aim to test whether the interaction term is economically meaningful or not. 
By showing this, we can validate that this term has also significant effect on macroeconomic 
indicators (namely inflation) and it is a necessary term in the trilemma regression. Similarly, 
ACI has also shown that reserves have such mitigating impact on macroeconomic variables, 
namely inflation and growth. In this context, we perform a VAR and a Granger causality 
analysis between inflation and this interaction term. Table 4A illustrates these results. 
According to VAR results, the interaction term significantly affects inflation with its first lag2. 
Moreover, the sign of the impact is negative hence policy mix has a decreasing effect on 
inflation as expected. Similarly, Granger causality analysis is shown in Table 4B supporting 
the view that the interaction term (representing all the supportive policy mix) has a significant 
impact on inflation by rejecting the null hypothesis of no Granger causality at 99% confidence 
level.  
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3.6 Robustness 
As a robustness check, we employ a different capital openness index for Capital Openness 
for all regressions to eliminate disadvantages of using a de facto capital openness measure. 
Thus, to construct a new capital openness measure, we divide the capital flow data into 4 
sub-categories in a way to represent the highest and lowest 25% percentile, 50% and 75% 
percentiles. Later, we assign values 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 to each group. In this set-up, the 
new index is different from a de facto measure as it does not change each month and as it 
does not solely depend on the capital flows. Likewise, it is also different from a de jure 
measure as it is not constant throughout the period. Results from the main trilemma 
regressions are shown at Table 3A and 3B. Results of this table are parallel to what is found 
in Table 2 in the sense that while capital openness has a negative contribution in the first 
equation, it becomes positive in the second equation. Yet, the contribution figures differ from 
each other indicating to a stronger exchange rate stability contribution and the interaction 
term has a smaller impact on the trilemma trade-offs as well.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigate Sweden’s macroeconomic policies for 2010-2017 M6 in the 
context of financial trilemma trade-offs. Our methodology starts with following ACI (2008) 
approach. Using monthly data, we construct trilemma indices for each of the three policy 
objectives: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and capital account openness. 
Using the main trilemma regression of ACI resulted in poor results in terms of reflecting 
Sweden’s economic policies. According to those, exchange rate stability is the sole factor 
that drives the policies making all other policies insignificant over the period. Yet, this is not 
accurate as the exchange rate stability is affected directly from monetary policy as 
Riksbank’s Inflation Report presents. Besides, capital openness should not have negative 
contribution as indicated by ACI trilemma regression results.   
 
We propose to improve ACI methodology by introducing an interaction term which is the 
multiplication of three policy indices to better capture Sweden’s policies. With addition of this 
interaction term, the trilemma regressions result in a more realistic picture: exchange rate 
stability has less contribution giving room to monetary independence and capital openness 
even though it is still the main factor.  The interaction term reflecting the harmony of all 
policies has a negative contribution mitigating the trade-offs. To understand this further, we 
 run a VAR and Granger causality analysis between inflation and the interaction term. 
According to our analyses, this interaction term is suggestive in the sense that it has 
significant and decreasing impact on inflation. 
 
  
 TABLES 
Table 1: Results for Standard Trilemma Regression (ACI Approach)3 
MI   0.48 
Means    ES  0.778 
KO  0.549 
Coefficients   MI  0.178** 
   ES  2.534*** 
   KO  -0.12 
Contributions  MI  0.085 
   ES  1.97 
   KO  -0.066 
 
Table 2: Results for Modified Trilemma Regression  
MI   0.48 
Means    ES  0.778 
KO  0.549 
INTERACTION 0.205 
Coefficients   MI  1.567*** 
   ES  1.608*** 
   KO  1.324*** 
   INTERACTION -3.578*** 
Contributions  MI  0.75 
   ES  1.25 
   KO  0.726 
   INTERACTION -0.733 
 
                                                          
3
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Table 3A: Results for Standard Trilemma Regression with new Capital Openness Measure (NKO) 
MI   0.48 
Means    ES  0.778 
NKO  0.597 
Coefficients   MI  0.148* 
   ES  2.589*** 
   NKO  -0.157** 
Contributions  MI  0.07 
   ES  2.01 
   NKO  -0.09 
 
Table 3B: Results for Modified Trilemma Regression with new Capital Openness Measure (NKO) 
Means    MI   0.48 
   ES  0.778 
NKO  0.597 
INTERACTION 0.222 
Coefficients   MI  1.027*** 
   ES  1.971*** 
   NKO  0.689*** 
   INTERACTION -1.995*** 
Contributions  MI   0.492 
   ES  1.533 
NKO  0.411 
INTERACTION -0.443 
 
 
 
 TABLE 4A: VAR Analysis  
   INTERACTION TERM     INFLATION 
Variable  Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat 
Int. Term(-1)  0.075  0.71    -1.522  -3.305 
Inflation (-1)  -0.052  -2.41    -0.327  -3.439 
Constant  0.193  8.20    0.418  4.067 
 
TABLE 4B: Granger Causality Test 
 
Variable      F stat   Prob. Value 
Int. Term does not Granger Cause Inflation  2.842   0.006 
Inflation does not Granger Cause Int. Term  1.001   0.453 
 
TABLE 4C: Robustness 
   INTERACTION TERM     INFLATION 
Variable  Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat 
Int. Term(-1)  0.33  3.39    -1.015  -3.316 
Inflation (-1)  -0.08  -2.65    -0.347  -3.617 
Constant  0.15  6.18    0.332  4.202 
 
 
   
 FIGURE 1: Trilemma Triangle 
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Figure 2: Exchange Rate Stability Index 
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 Figure 3: Monetary Independence Index 
 
Figure 4: Capital Openness Index 
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